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The attraction effect in motor planning decisions
George D. Farmer∗† Wael El-Deredy‡† Andrew Howes§ Paul A. Warren†
Abstract
In motor lotteries the probability of success is inherent in a person’s ability to make a speeded pointing movement. By
contrast, in traditional economic lotteries, the probability of success is explicitly stated. Decision making with economic
lotteries has revealed many violations of rational decision making models. However, with motor lotteries people’s performance
is often near optimal, and is well described by statistical decision theory. We report the results of an experiment testing whether
motor planning decisions exhibit the attraction effect, a well-known axiomatic violation of some rational decision models.
The effect occurs when changing the composition of a choice set alters preferences between its members. We provide the first
demonstration that people do exhibit the attraction effect when choosing between motor lotteries. We also found that people
exhibited a similar sized attraction effect in motor and traditional economic paradigms. People’s near-optimal performance
with motor lotteries is characterized by the efficiency of their decisions. In attraction effect experiments performance is instead
characterized by the violation of an axiom. We discuss the extent that axiomatic and efficiency measures can provide insight
in assessing the rationality of decision making.
Keywords: attraction effect, motor planning, preference reversals, optimality.
1 Introduction
Decisions occur at multiple levels in the cognitive hierar-
chy. For example, a higher-level decision might be between
competing pension investments. A lower-level decision, on
the other hand, might be between different hand trajectories
available in order to pick up a glass. As a consequence, dif-
ferent methods have been developed to allow researchers to
study decisions across the hierarchy.
On first inspection, some methods, used at some levels in
the hierarchy, appear to result in better decisions than oth-
ers. For example, a recently developed approach involves
asking subjects to hit a touch-screen displaying reward and
penalty zones (Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 2008).
Subjects in these paradigms cannot be sure where they will
make contact because there is a severe time limit forcing
them to make a rapid movement. Given this uncertainty, the
decision they must make is where to aim in order to maxi-
mize reward. Research using this method has revealed that,
of all the possible aim points, people select one that is close
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to maximizing reward. It is possible to argue therefore, that
in these motor lotteries people make near optimal decisions
given the uncertainty induced by noise in their motor sys-
tem.
In addition to selecting the optimal aim point within a
configuration of penalty and gain zones, it has been shown
that subjects can select between alternative configurations
according to which has the highest expected gain (Trommer-
shäuser, Landy, & Maloney, 2006). Subjects were presented
with two alternative configurations of gain and penalty
zones and were instructed to choose one. Subjects reliably
chose the configuration that contained the most valuable aim
point. This suggests that not only do people choose the aim
point that maximizes their gain, but also that this ability also
translates into a higher level task of choosing between dif-
ferent configurations of motor lotteries.
A more traditional paradigm in decision making research,
which has been used to probe higher level decision making,
involves explicitly described lotteries of the form “a 50%
chance of $10”. These traditional lottery selection tasks
have been used to highlight a number of ways in which hu-
man decision making apparently violates rational models,
indicating that our decision making is not always optimal
(Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981,
1992).
The contrast in performance (with respect to what is opti-
mal) between motor and traditional paradigms might mean
that people are simply better decision makers when it comes
to motor tasks. There is, however, recent evidence that this
is not be the case. Wu, Delgado, and Maloney (2009) looked
for a violation of the independence axiom (i.e., the common
consequence effect Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) in motor
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planning decisions. In these motor planning decisions sub-
jects are first trained in their own motor noise while attempt-
ing to hit a target. They are then presented with alternative
hypothetical targets which have associated rewards. Cru-
cially, these motor lotteries can be made to be mathemati-
cally equivalent to traditional lotteries. Having established
a fair basis for comparison of the two paradigms, Wu et al.
(2009) found that the independence axiom was violated in
both types of decision.
Jarvstad, Hahn, Rushton, and Warren (2013) found fur-
ther evidence of similarities, rather than differences, be-
tween motor and traditional decision making. They argue
that the apparent difference in optimality is partly a product
of using different performance metrics. The performance
metric in motor tasks is often based on efficiency, i.e., how
much of the maximum possible gain people achieve. This
is a sensible metric to use because there are many different
aim points that have very different expected values. How-
ever, the performance metric in traditional decision making
tasks is often based on compliance with axioms required by
rational models, such as the independence axiom mentioned
above. Given these different ways of assessing performance,
it is not straightforward to compare existing motor and tra-
ditional decision making experiments. Jarvstad et al. (2013)
compared motor and traditional decision making whilst us-
ing the same efficiency metric to assess performance in each.
Subjects were presented with decisions between gambles
that varied in expected value. The efficiency of their per-
formance compared to that of a theoretical optimal decision
maker, was approximately 92% in both the motor and tradi-
tional economic paradigms. There was no significant differ-
ence between motor and traditional decision making when
assessed with an efficiency metric.
In the present study we further probe the consistency of
motor planning and traditional economic decision making
by testing for the attraction effect. We have used a standard
motor lottery planning paradigm in which people make de-
cisions between different potential movements. As in the
existing literature using this paradigm (Jarvstad et al., 2013;
Wu et al., 2009; Zhang, Daw, & Maloney, 2015), subjects
are trained on their motor noise in a pointing task, and then
given choices between alternatives that closely represent the
training trials, but without the performing the movement.
The objective is to understand people’s movement planning
based on their internal representation of their motor error.
We examine whether the attraction effect can influence this
planning process.
The attraction effect is a further example of a sub-optimal
decision making phenomenon revealed by the violation of
an axiom (Huber et al., 1982). Specifically, this effect vi-
olates the axioms of independence from irrelevant alterna-
tives (IIA Luce, 1959) and regularity. These axioms are part
of many rational value-maximizing models, and require that
decision makers assess each alternative independently of the
other alternatives. The attraction effect suggests that people
do not do this, since adding an alternative to a choice set ap-
pears to change preferences between the original members.
The effect has therefore had a major influence on decision
making theory and is frequently cited as evidence that ratio-
nal value-maximizing models do not describe human deci-
sion making (Ariely & Wallsten, 1995; Heath & Chatterjee,
1991; Huber et al., 1982; Louie, Khaw, & Glimcher, 2013;
Ratneshwar, Shocker, & Stewart, 1987; Roe, Busemeyer,
& Townsend, 2001; Sen, 1998; Simonson, 1989; Tsetsos,
Usher, & Chater, 2010; Tversky & Simonson, 1993; Usher
& McClelland, 2004).
To elicit the attraction effect, choices are described on two
attributes that trade-off, for instance acceleration and fuel-
efficiency in cars. Consider a person torn between car A
with good acceleration, but low fuel-efficiency, and car B
with poor acceleration, but high fuel-efficiency. The attrac-
tion effect tells us that offering an additional third option
which is similar to A but slightly worse on both attributes
(or the same on one attribute and worse on the other) would
bias a typical decision maker toward choosing car A over
car B.
The effect has been demonstrated in a variety of product
categories (Huber et al., 1982), including lotteries (Herne,
1999; Soltani, De Martino, & Camerer, 2012; Wedell,
1991). For lotteries, the two attributes that trade-off are
probability and value. Figure 1 shows a configuration in
which the attraction effect would be expected to occur. The
safe lottery (“safe” because it has higher probability of suc-
cess) is called the target because it strictly dominates the
decoy on both attributes, making it more likely to be chosen
than the risky lottery (“risky” because it has lower proba-
bility of success), called the competitor. Note that the com-
petitor is better than the decoy only on one attribute. The
attraction effect is an extremely robust phenomenon, which
as well as being shown across a wide range of products, also
occurs across a variety of species, including birds, honey-
bees (Shafir, Waite, & Smith, 2002) and even slime mould
(Latty & Beekman, 2011). Contextual preference reversals
have also been shown in lower level perceptual decisions,
Trueblood, Brown, Heathcote, and Busemeyer (2013) found
the attraction effect in deciding which of three rectangles
had the larger area.
A critical feature of attraction effect experiments is that
subjects must decide between target and competitor alterna-
tives that are designed to be approximately equally attrac-
tive. In the case of choices between lotteries, these will
have identical or very similar expected values. This ma-
nipulation exists so that subjects are maximally uncertain as
to which alternative they prefer. This aspect of attraction
effect experiments means that the efficiency metric used to
determine near-optimality in motor tasks is not suitable. In
attraction effect experiments the two viable options (the tar-
get and competitor) are equally efficient.
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The experiments conducted by Trommershäuser et al.
(2006) appear to show that people choose between differ-
ent configurations according to which configuration con-
tains the most valuable aim point. This suggests that in the
evaluation and planning of different motor lotteries, people
are able to choose according to which will maximize value.
However, as in most motor paradigms these findings re-
late to choices between configurations that vary in expected
value and therefore an efficiency metric is suitable.
As argued by Jarvstad et al. (2013), it may be necessary
to use designs with alternatives that do not vary in expected
value in order to elicit sub-optimal decision making phe-
nomena. In a previous experiment using perceptual and ex-
plicit representations of probability, we have found that in-
troducing a difference in expected value between lotteries
can eliminate the attraction effect. (Farmer et al., submit-
ted). It is possible therefore, that it is the nature of the
pay-off environment, and the performance measure used,
that drives whether many sub-optimal phenomena will be
elicited. We expect that a motor paradigm can be used to
elicit the attraction effect, if the available alternatives are ap-
proximately equally valuable. We will suggest a potentially
unifying account of the different findings that emerge from
efficiency and axiomatic measures of performance. It may
be that axiomatic violations occur precisely when there is
the least consequence in terms of efficiency, and that these
axiomatic violations reflect an attempt to resolve residual
uncertainty left over by a value-maximizing decision pro-
cess.
In the experiment reported here, we test for the attrac-
tion effect in motor planning decisions. Using the Wu et
al. (2009) method we constructed choice sets of motor lot-
teries, and mathematically equivalent traditional lotteries as
a control. If the attraction effect occurs, then, as well as
being the first demonstration of this phenomenon in motor
planning decisions, it will provide further evidence that the
discrepancy in performance between motor and traditional
higher-level decision making may be unfounded.
2 Method
Our method of creating motor lotteries that are mathemati-
cally equivalent to explicitly described lotteries, is adapted
from Wu et al. (2009); Wu, Delgado, and Maloney (2011).
This involves measuring a subject’s variance over repeated
attempts to hit a target. This variance is used to determine
the width of target necessary to achieve a chosen probability
that it will be hit. Subjects can then be offered choices be-
tween targets of differing widths equivalent to offering them
choices between lotteries of varying probability.
Figure 1: The attraction effect. If a decoy lottery is added to
the dashed area, the safe lottery will gain choice share from
the risky lottery. If the decoy were instead added to the solid
area, then the risky lottery would be the target, and would
gain choice share from the safe lottery—now the competitor.
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2.1 Subjects
Sixty one (eight male) undergraduate subjects with a mean
age of 20 (SD = 2) were recruited from the University of
Manchester. Subjects received course credit for taking part
in the experiment, and attended for one session of approxi-
mately 40 minutes.
2.2 Materials
A 19 inch touch-screen at a resolution of 1280 by 1024 pix-
els was used throughout the experiment. In the choice phase
subjects responded by pressing 1, 2 or 3 on the numeric key-
pad of a standard Windows keyboard. The experiment was
created in the Python programming language and run on a
Microsoft Windows 7 PC.
2.3 Design
We used a 3 context (target, neutral, competitor) x 2
paradigm (motor, traditional), entirely within subjects de-
sign. The attraction effect predicts that the same alternative
will be chosen more often when it is a target than when it
is neutral or a competitor. An alternative is a target when it
dominates a decoy on one attribute, and is equal to, or better
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than, the decoy on the other attribute. To test for the attrac-
tion effect, we constructed a safe lottery (higher probability
of success) which had a value of £20 and a success probabil-
ity of 70%. This was offered alongside a risky lottery (lower
probability of success) which had a value of £75 and a suc-
cess probability of 30%. This pair of lotteries was presented
nine times with each as the target and another nine times
with no decoy present (neutral). This resulted in 27 trials
per paradigm. This design allowed us to calculate a choice
rate for each lottery in each context i.e., the proportion of
times it was chosen for each placement of the decoy.
Rather than present identical choices nine times, the val-
ues and probabilities were jittered such that values were ei-
ther £19, £20 or, £21 and probabilities were either .69, .70 or
.71. This resulted in nine safe lotteries with a mean value of
.7(£20). The same procedure was applied to the risky lottery
and the decoy lotteries.
The two paradigm levels (motor and traditional) differed
only in the way that the probability of the lottery was dis-
played. In the traditional paradigm, the value and probabil-
ity of a lottery were displayed on-screen in numerical format
(see Figure 2). In the motor paradigm the probability of the
lottery corresponded to varying widths of targets (Figure 3).
In both paradigms the hypothetical amount to be won was
displayed in the form ‘£20’.
As in previous studies with rapid pointing tasks (reviewed
in Trommershäuser et al., 2008) a time limit meant that
subjects could not be sure of hitting the target. Our sub-
jects completed a training phase prior to the choice phase in
which we recorded their hit points to recover a distribution
of their accuracy around a target center. This distribution of
subjects’ hit points was then used to create individualized
stimuli in the choice phase. This allowed us to control the
probability of success for each subject by varying the width
of the targets they were presented with.
A pilot study was conducted to determine a value that
would make the risky lottery subjectively equivalent to the
safe lottery. Decoys were always .15 less likely to win and
of £5 less value than their dominating lottery.
2.4 Procedure
2.4.1 Training phase
In the training phase subjects learned their own motor noise
in a rapid pointing task. Subjects were instructed to touch
a green bar on the left hand side of the screen with the in-
dex finger of their dominant hand, after which they had 500
msec to touch a yellow target bar on the right hand side of
the screen with the same finger. The target zone was 20 pix-
els in width and 1025 pixels to right of the of the start bar.
The start bar was 50 pixels wide and covered the full height
of the display (1024 pixels), as did the target zone.
Subjects completed 100 training trials as described above.
Figure 2: Example stimulus in the traditional condition.
Subjects indicated which lottery they would prefer to play.
Evaluate
56%
£16
71% 31%
£21 £76
Figure 3: Example stimulus in the motor condition. Sub-
jects were told to indicate which of the three lotteries they
would prefer. The width of the targets (black bars) was ma-
nipulated to achieve probabilities identical to those used in
the traditional paradigm.
Evaluate
£16 £21 £76
Subjects were not informed that they would be making de-
cisions between different target widths in the subsequent
choice phase. If subjects successfully hit the target within
the time limit the word “Hit” would appear in green. If
they were within the time limit but missed, the word “Miss”
was displayed in orange. If they exceeded the time limit,
the message ‘Too slow’ was displayed in red and a warning
sound was played.
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2.4.2 Choice phase
In the choice phase subjects saw three lotteries presented
on the screen and a message stating “Evaluate” above them
(see figure 3). Subjects were instructed to press the space
bar when they were ready to indicate their choice. The mes-
sage would then change to “Choose”, and one of three lot-
teries would disappear. Subjects had to choose between the
remaining two lotteries by pressing the appropriate number
on the keyboard. In the majority of trials the decoy was re-
moved when the space bar was pressed. However, in some
trials the decoy remained and either the target or competi-
tor lotteries were removed. These trials were excluded from
the analysis but were included in the stimuli to encourage
subjects to evaluate all the lotteries. Subjects indicated their
preferred lottery using the numeric keypad, 1 for the left
most lottery in the display, 2 for the middle lottery and 3 for
the right-most lottery. The 54 trials (27 motor and 27 tradi-
tional) were presented in random order such that the motor
and traditional trials were mixed together. Each subject ex-
perienced a different random order. The position of each
alternative on the screen was also randomized.
Subjects had only two seconds to make their response af-
ter pressing the space bar. If they exceeded this time limit,
“Too slow” was displayed and the trial was discarded from
the analysis. The process of evaluating, removing an op-
tion, and choosing under a time constraint was adapted from
Soltani et al. (2012) with the purpose of forcing subjects to
take all three alternatives into consideration when making
their choice. Since the subjects experienced some trials (not
analyzed) on which the target is removed and the decoy re-
mained they had to take the decoy into account as a viable
option.
In the choice phase subjects were asked to indicate which
lottery they would prefer, but they did not go on to play
the lottery, nor receive any other type of feedback. For the
motor lottery choices subjects were instructed to imagine
that their chosen option would be played out in a manner
identical to the motor training phase. If they successfully hit
the target they would win the amount shown, otherwise they
would win nothing.
3 Results
The left panel in Figure 4 shows the results for the tradi-
tional paradigm. The safe lottery was chosen more often
when it was the target than when it was the competitor. The
neutral bar in the figure indicates the rate that the safe lot-
tery was chosen when there was no decoy present. Overall
in the traditional paradigm, the safe lottery was chosen in
70% of trials when it was the target, and in 57% of trials
when it was the competitor. The preference reversal rate
was therefore 13%, and is consistent with other studies of
Figure 5: Quantile-quantile plot of a subject’s hit points dur-
ing the training phase. The y axis shows the location in pix-
els of the hit point. The center of the target was at 1100
pixels. The hit points are well described by a normal distri-
bution.
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the attraction effect in choices between lotteries (Soltani et
al., 2012; Wedell, 1991).
Analysis of the motor training phase showed that the dis-
tribution of subjects’ hit points was well described by a nor-
mal distribution centered on the target (see Figure 5). Table
1 shows the change in the hit point, the standard deviation of
the hit point and the duration of a pointing movement in each
quarter of the training phase. From the outset, subjects’ aim
points were centered on the middle of the target, which was
located at 1100 pixels. As the training progressed subjects’
motor variability reduced slightly from 21 to 18 pixels.
The right panel in Figure 4 shows the rate the safe lot-
tery was chosen when it was the target and the rate it was
chosen when it was the competitor, in the motor condition.
Subjects chose the safe lottery in 73% of trials when it was
the target, and in 62% of trials when it was the competitor.
Consequently, the motor preference reversal rate was 11%.
Data were transformed by taking the arcsine of the square
root of the choice proportions. A 2 (paradigm) x 3 (context)
repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of
context F (1.75, 105.18) = 21.73, p < .001, η2
p
= .27), but
not of paradigm p = .26. There was no significant interac-
tion p = .63. Bonferroni corrected post hoc comparisons
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Figure 4: Proportion of trials the same lottery was chosen according to the context in which it was presented. The left
panel shows that, for the traditional condition, the safe lottery was chosen more often when it was presented as a target,
consistent with the attraction effect. The right panel shows the same analysis for the motor condition, subjects also chose
motor lotteries more often when they were targets than when they were competitors. Error bars are standard error
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Table 1: Motor training summary statistics. Values show
are the median statistic across all subjects from the motor
training session.
Hit point
Standard
Deviation
Duration
(ms)
Block 1 1099 21 407
Block 2 1099 19 430
Block 3 1098 19 434
Block 4 1099 18 437
revealed that all three levels of the context IV (target, neu-
tral and competitor) were significantly different from one
another.
4 Discussion
Our results provide evidence that changing the composition
of a choice set affects how motor lotteries are evaluated.
More specifically, subjects exhibited the attraction effect by
selecting a lottery more often when it dominated a decoy
than when it did not. This finding adds to the body of lit-
erature showing that the attraction effect is pervasive across
tasks and organisms. These data provide the first evidence
of contextual preference reversals in the evaluation of motor
lotteries.
The presence of the attraction effect in the evaluation of
motor lotteries lends support to previous findings by Jarvs-
tad et al. (2013) and Wu et al. (2009). Whilst Jarvstad et
al. (2013) found that choices in motor and traditional lot-
teries were equally efficient, Wu et al. (2009) found that
violation of the independence axiom in traditional lotteries
can be elicited in mathematically equivalent motor lotteries.
Taken together, this previous research suggests that when
the same performance metrics are used, the optimality of
decision making does not differ between motor and tradi-
tional paradigms. This conclusion is strongly supported by
the results we report here. We found that choice sets used to
elicit the attraction effect in traditional lotteries, also work
in equivalent motor lotteries.
Decision making that violates axioms required by ratio-
nal models is often exhibited in choice sets where there is
little consequence to the decision maker of the violation;
the bias or irrationality is a logical one, but not necessarily
a practical one (Hahn & Harris, 2014, see also Dunwoody,
2009 for a similar distinction between coherence and corre-
spondence in decision making). Whilst decision making in
motor lotteries may appear optimal, that is potentially be-
cause the measure of performance is essentially a practical
one. Our results suggest that the optimality or otherwise of
decision making is not dependent on the paradigm, but on
how we define and measure optimality. In choice sets with
alternatives that vary in efficiency, and where efficiency is
used as the performance metric, both motor and traditional
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paradigms can be used to elicit near optimal decision mak-
ing. In choice sets where alternatives have very similar ex-
pected values, and performance is measured by conformity
with axioms, both motor and traditional paradigms can be
used to elicit apparently irrational decision making.
One question that remains to be answered is why contex-
tual effects, such as the attraction effect, occur in choices
that are approximately equally attractive? Existing explana-
tions of the attraction effect focus on the neural and algo-
rithmic processes which might produce the effect (Bhatia,
2013; Noguchi & Stewart, 2014; Roe et al., 2001; Simon-
son, 1989; Stewart, 2009; Usher & McClelland, 2004). We
suggest a new interpretation that has the potential to unify
the findings from different performance metrics. A value-
maximizing decision making process is least useful when
the alternatives on offer have the same value. Given a sit-
uation in which the available alternatives appear to have
roughly the same value (as the attraction effect choice sets
are by design) additional information can be gleaned from
the composition of the choice set. Consider a set of target,
decoy and competitor lotteries. All appear to have similar
expected values, but given that the target must be greater
than the decoy, there is also an increased likelihood that it
will be better than then competitor. Of the six possible util-
ity rankings among the alternatives, only those in which the
target exceeds the decoy are permitted. In two-thirds of this
subset of rankings the target has higher expected value than
the competitor. The only prerequisite for this information
to be useful is that the decision maker cannot calculate ex-
pected value with perfect accuracy (Howes et al., submit-
ted).
The attraction effect may be an entirely rational use of
contextual information in choice sets where the available
alternatives are approximately equally valuable. One only
needs to assume noise in the calculation of expected value
for this to be true. This raises the intriguing possibility that
axiomatic violations of rationality are the result of the deci-
sion maker trying to exceed what value maximization alone
can achieve. Of course, in choice sets where the alternatives
are very variable, the process of value maximization exceeds
any subtle influence of context. The rationality we attribute
to the attraction effect is computational (Howes, Lewis, &
Vera, 2009; Lewis, Howes, & Singh, 2014) rather than nor-
mative. To be clear, a person capable of making perfect ex-
pected value calculations should not exhibit the attraction
effect. However, a person with a noisy ability to estimate
expected value, can reduce the noise by taking into account
the dominance of the target over the decoy.
Axiomatic violations such as the attraction effect are typ-
ically interpreted as evidence that value maximizing models
fail to describe human decision making. The presence of
the attraction effect in motor lotteries suggests an alterna-
tive interpretation in which these effects reflect a decision
maker’s efforts to exceed what a value maximizing model
would achieve in choice sets where alternatives are similarly
valued. Some axiomatic violations may not be irrational,
they may exist to resolve residual uncertainty that cannot be
resolved by pure value-maximization. In that sense, they are
entirely rational given that uncertainty, that is, they are com-
putationally rational because they optimize reward given the
constraints that bound cognition. Further work should focus
on testing this insight for other axiomatic violations.
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